In a (first price) all-pay auction, bidders simultaneously submit bids for an item. All players forfeit their bids, and the high bidder receives the item. This auction is widely used in economics to model rent seeking, R&D races, political contests, and job promotion tournaments. We fully characterize equilibrium for this class of games, and show that the set of equilibria is much larger than has been recognized in the literature. When there are more than two players, for instance, we show that even when the auction is symmetric there exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. Moreover, for economically important configurations of valuations, there is no revenue equivalence across the equilibria; asymmetric equilibria imply higher expected revenues than the symmetric equilibrium.
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The all-pay auction is similar to a standard (winner pay) first-price auction, except that losers must also pay the auctioneer their bids)
In an all-pay auction, one can interpret differences in the vi's as arising from differences in abilities. To see this, suppose the utility to player i of winning a prize of W by putting forth effort x i is u* = UI(W ) -~ixi, where x i is effort, and/3~ is the marginal cost to player i of effort. Since behavior is invariant to affine transformations, we may just as well write the utility function as u~ =-u*/~ i = v~ -x i, where v i --Ui(W)/~ ~. Thus, differences in the vi's may be due to differences in valuations or differences in the abilities of players to convert an entry into a prize: players with higher vi's can be thought of as stronger players.
The all pay auction is widely used in economics because it captures the essential elements of contests. It has been used to model (1) the lobbying for rents in regulated and trade protected industries [cf. Moulin (1986a, b) ; Hillman and Riley (1989) ; Hillman and Samet (1987) ; Hillman (1988) and Baye et al. (1993) ], (2) technological competition and R&D races [cf, Dasgupta (1986) ], and (3) a host of other situations including political campaigns, tournaments and job promotion. 2 Essentially, these economic problems boil down to a contest that is an all-pay auction in effort; the player putting forth the greatest effort wins the prize, while the efforts of other contestants go unrewarded. 3 Section II of this paper completely characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the first price all-pay auction with complete information. Our characterization shows that for n > 2 the set of equilibria is larger than recognized in the existing literature, and critically depends on the configurations of player valuations. We show that with homogeneous valuations (vl = v a = v 3 .... v,) there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium and a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. All of these equilibria are payoff equivalent, as is the expected sum of the bids (revenue to the auctioneer).
1 The war of attrition is a second-price all pay auction: all players forfeit their bids except the winner, who pays the second-highest bid. Hendricks et al. (1988) characterize the set of equilibria for the war of attrition with complete information in continuous time and with general payoff functions. 2 For instance, in the literature on rent seeking (Tullock, 1980) , political campaigns (Snyder, 1989) , job promotions (Rosen, 1986), and commitment (Dixit, 1987) , the probability player i wins a contest by putting forth an effort ofx~ is modeled as x./Zjx, where 7 > 0. As ? goes to infinity the player putting forth 9 . . r j' .... the greatest effort is certam to win the contest, and thus the hmlt of these models is the all-pay auction. The all-pay auction may also be interpreted as the limit of many games with uncertainty or incomplete information, including the models of Lazear and Rosen (1981) , Nalebuff and Sfiglitz (1983), Weber (1985) , and Bull, Sehotter and Weigelt (1987) . As the incomplete information or uncertainty vanishes, these models converge to the complete information all-pay auction. 3 Many other games with discontinuous payoffs (and in which only mixed-strategy equilibria exist) have a structure that is isomorphic to the all-pay auction, including Varian (1980) , Narasimhan (1988) , Broecker (1990) Raju et al. (1990) , , Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1992) , Deneckere et al. (1992) , and Dennert (1993) . The characterization results presented in this paper are thus pertinent to a wide body of literature in economics.
When vl > v 2 = v 3 >_ v 4 >_ ... > v n, there is a unique "symmetric equilibrium" (symmetric in the sense that all agents with identical values use the same strategy), as well as a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. The expected sum of the bids (revenue to the auctioneer) varies across the continuum of equilibria; there is not "revenue equivalence." The case where v 1 > v z > v 3 > ... > v, is known to have a unique equilibrium (Hillman and Riley, 1989) . 4 Our theoretical results have important implications for economic applications of the all-pay auction. To highlight these implications, Section III reconsiders the regulation game analyzed by Wenders (1987) and Ellingsen (1991) .
II Characterization of equilibria
The all-pay auction with complete information does not have a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, but does have a Nash equilibrium in mixed-strategies. Accordingly, let Gi(xl) denote the cumulative distribution function (cdf) representing the equilibrium mixed-strategy of player i. Player i is said to randomize continuously on A ~ R if he plays a mixed strategy that is atomless (i.e., contains no mass points) and has a strictly increasing cdf almost everywhere on A.
Our first theorem characterizes equilibrium for the case when m > 2 players have the highest valuation of the prize. For this case, Hillman and Samet (1987) have shown that there exists a symmetric equilibrium and a finite number of asymmetric equilibria where some agents with the highest valuation bid zero with probability one, and claim this exhausts all equilibria. Our Theorem 1 shows, however, that there actually exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria when three or more players have the highest valuation of the prize. Nonetheless, we show that all of the equilibria imply the same expected payoff (zero) for each player, and yield the auctioneer the same expected revenue. The formal proof of Theorem 1 is similar to the proof contained in the Appendix for our Theorem 2 below, and is thus omitted (our 1990 working paper contains a complete proof). However, it is useful to highlight some of the features of equilibrium, as well as some intuition for the existence of a continuum of equilibria. The basic issues can be illustrated in the case where re=n=3, so that v 1 --v z = v3 (-v, say) . Theorem 1 implies, in this case, that in every equilibrium two players randomize continuously on the interval [0, v] , while the third player randomizes continuously on the interval [b, v] and concentrates all remaining mass at zero (this mass is (b/v) 1/2, and is thus zero ifb = 0). (Note that b > 0 is an arbitrary constant). Since two players randomize continuously on [0, v] , and any atoms in the third player's mixed strategy (player 3's, say) are isolated at 0, the highest bid is positive and unique with probability one. Furthermore, since zero is contained in the support of all three players' mixed strategies and at least two players use mixed strategies that do not put mass at zero, each player earns an expected payoff of zero.
Given the characterization of the support of each player's mixed strategy, we know that all three players randomize continuously on [-b, v] , and hence, all three are capable of generating a winning bid in the interval [b, v] . Equilibrium requires that, for any bid in [b, v] , each player earns an expected payoff of zero, given the mixed strategies used by the other two players. Three non-degenerate mixed strategies over [b, v] are uniquely determined as the solution to three equations that set the expected payoff of each player i to be zero for bids in [b, v] : [b, v-l. The solution to this system of equations is symmetric and given by [b, v] . The probability player 3 submits a winning bid in the interval [0, b] is zero, since the characterization of player 3's support requires that (remaining) mass of G3 (b ) - (b/v) 1/2 be isolated at 0 if b > 0. Given G3 (b ) , and the fact that only players 1 and 2 can submit a winning bid in the interval [0, b] with positive probability, the mixed strategies for players 1 and 2 must satisfy
For a given b, the solution to this system of equations is symmetric:
These mixed-strategies for players 1 and 2 are sufficiently aggressive on the interval [0, b] to ensure that player 3 will not find it profitable to deviate by submitting a bid in the open interval (0, b).
Thus, for a given b, we have constructed Nash equilibrium mixed-strategies for the three players. On the interval [b, v] , all players randomize continuously according to the three-player symmetric equilibrium. On the interval [0, b] , player 3's mixed strategy concentrates all mass at zero (unless b = 0), while players 1 and 2 randomize continuously according to mixed-strategies that are proportional to the two-player symmetric equilibrium. But since b is arbitrary, by varying b from 0 to v one generates a continuum of equilibria, ranging from the unique symmetric equilibrium (when b = 0) to the extremely asymmetric one in which only players 1 and 2 actively compete (when b = v, player 3 bids zero with probability one). 7
More generally, Theorem 1 allows us to explicitly characterize the algebraic form of the family of equilibrium mixed strategies for the case where v 1 --v 2 = v 3 --.... v,, > Vm+ 1 > "'" >_V n. Let v = v 1 = v 2 = v 3 ..... v m. By the theorem, players m + 1 through n bid zero with probability one, so suppose without loss of generality that players i = 1,2 ..... h, m > h _ 2, randomize continuously over [0,v] with players i=h+l,...,m randomizing continuously over [bi, v] (The bi's are arbitrary, and varying the b~'s generates the continuum of equilibria). Players m + 1 through n bid zero with probability one. One can easily verify that the following family of cdf's are equilibrium strategies for the players:
i:?
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By Theorem 1, these are all the possible equilibrium cdf's, s Our next Theorem shows that revenue equivalence breaks down when one "strong" player competes against several weaker, but equal, players. This case is economically interesting, because in the literature on regulation (cf. Rogerson, 1982 and Ellingsen, 1991) , R&D races (Dasgupta, 1986) , or political contests (cf. Snyder, 1989) , one player (often the incumbent) is modeled as having an advantage over a number of identical challengers. Hillman (1988) s The symmetric equilibrium (h = m) is used in Moulin (1986b) and Dasgupta (1986) . Somewhat more general is the case b h + ~ = v and 2 _< h _< m, i.e. some agents may be inactive. This is discussed in Hillman and Samet (1987, p. 72), Hillman (1988, p. 66) and Hillman and Riley (1989, fn. 12) . Hillman and Samet (1987, p. 72) claim there are no other equilibria. Also, Proposition lc in Hilhnan and Riley which claims that at most one active agent bids zero with positive probability is erroneous, as up to m -2 active agents can do so. This theorem, which is proved in the Appendix, allows us to construct the family of equilibrium mixed-strategies for the case where v 1 > v z ..... vm> vm+z > ---_> v,. By the theorem, players m + 1 through n bid zero with probability one, so suppose without loss of generality that of the players {2 ..... m} players i = 2,..., h, h > 2 randomize continuously over (0, v2] , with players i = h + 1 ..... m randomizing continuously over (bi, ve] , (where bi = v2 implies ~i(0)= 1) with bh+ ~ <_bh+z<_ ... <_bm<_v2. (Again, the bi's are arbitrary, and varying the bi's generates the continuum of equilibria). Players m + 1 through n bid zero with probability one. In light of Theorem 2, the family of cdf's below constitute the entire set of Nash equilibrium strategies:
1) 1 GI(X)= X~ --02-~-Xl(2-m)/(m-1)
Vx~ [bj, bj+ l 
In addition to the multiplicity of equilibria, the key implication of Theorem 2 is part C: expected revenue varies across the continuum of equilibria. Note that the theorem states that expected revenue is maximized in the equilibrium that maximizes the expected bid of the player with the highest valuation. Given the form of the mixed strategies in equation (4), this occurs in the asymmetric equilibrium where player 1 and exactly one other player submit a positive bid with positive probability. ~ z
To complete the characterization, we need the following result originally formulated by Hillman (1988) and Hillman and Riley (1989) (a rigorous proof is contained in our 1990 CentER working paper):
Theorem 3 (Hillman and Riley): If va > l) 2 > 1) 3 ~ "'" ~__ l)n, the Nash equilibrium is unique. In equilibrium, player 1 randomizes continuously on [0, v2]. Player 2 randomizes continuously on (0, v2], placing an atom of size g2(0)= (v 1 -Vz)/V 1 at zero. Players 3 through n bid zero with probability one. Player l's equilibrium payoff is u* = v 1 -v2, while players 2 through n earn payoffs of zero.
The algebraic form of the equilibrium mixed strategies for the case when v I > v 2 > v 3 _> ... >_ v, are as follows. Players 3 through n bid zero with probability one. Players one and two randomize according to GI 
(X)----X/I) 2 and G2(x ) = (v 1 -v z + x)/v 1 for xe[O, v23. III A concluding example
We conclude with an example that highlights our results in the context of the regulatory contest discussed by Wenders (1987) and Ellingsen (1991) . 23 Suppose 12 Milgrom (1981) and Bikhchandani and Riley (1991) examine a similar issue in standard (winner pay) auctions, and find the opposite result often holds for classes of standard auctions: symmetric strategies may yield higher expected revenues. 13 Of course, there are numerous other applications, as noted in the introduction. For example, the following analysis is analogous to the case of an incumbent versus a number of potential entrants as discussed in Rogerson (1982) and Dasgupta (1986) . M > 2 potential producers compete for the monopoly right to run a public utility. They face opposition from a consumer organization. The regulatory body decides to reward the organization which exerts the highest effort in the lobbying process. If this turns out to be one of the producers, the monopoly solution is implemented. If the consumer organization wins, the marginal cost pricing solution is implemented.
If the consumer group wins, it earns a payoff equal to the sum of the would-be monopoly profits (call this amount "T" for "Tullock square") and the would-be deadweight loss (H, for "Harberger triangle"). If one of the producers wins, it earns the monopoly profits, T. Thus v 1 = T+ H and 1)2 = /)3 ..... VM+ 1 = T. By Theorem 2A, there exists a continuum of equilibria to this game, and by 2C the equilibria are not revenue equivalent. In particular, the expected revenue to the regulator is
Since Ex~ varies depending upon which equilibrium is played, when the regulator receives the lobbying expenditures as "bribes" she is not indifferent to the equilibrium that is played. By Theorem 2C, Exl is maximized when only one of the firms participates in the lobbying process. 14 The selfish regulator does best in the equilibrium where only the consumer group and one of the M firms engage in lobbying.
It turns out that the expected social waste due to lobbying also depends on which equilibrium is played. Suppose that only a proportion 2, 0 < 2 < 1, of the lobbying expenditures is socially wasteful (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1977; Brooks and Heydra, 1990; and Dougan, 1991) . Expected social waste, W, equals the expected deadweight loss plus a fraction 2 of the expected lobbying expenditures. If P~ is the probability the consumer group wins, then the expected social waste is W = (1 -P~)H + 2E~x i. (7) If2 = 1 (all of the lobbying is socially wasteful) the expected social waste is T. Notice that this result is independent of which equilibrium is played. ~ 6 In contrast, when 0 _< 2 < 1 the expected social waste is a decreasing function of Exl, which in turn depends on which equilibrium is played. By Theorem 2C, it follows that the more symmetric the bidding strategies of the producers, the greater the expected social waste, W. This holds irrespective of 2, except when lobbying is completely wasteful (in which case, 2 = 1 and hence W = T). When 2e [0, 1), different equilibria imply different expected social wastes, and society prefers fewer firms lobbying for monopoly rights to more.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of 2A and 2B: The proof of parts A and B of Theorem 2 are contained in the following lemmas. Before proceeding, note that if gi andsl are the upper and lower bounds of the support of player i's mixed strategy, then Vi, vl > gi ->& -> 0. Also, recall that ei(x) is the mass placed at x by player i's mixed strategy.
The first lemma is used in Lemma 2 to show that the lower bound of the support of each player's mixed strategy is zero. Proof." Clearly, v~ >_s i > 0 Vi, so it is sufficient to show that no player employs a mixed strategy that has a support with a strictly positive lower bound. By way of contradiction, suppose S ---{i[_s~ > 0} is nonempty, i.e.,& > 0 for at least one i.
If S consists of a single player i, then sl >s t = 0 Vj # i. In this case, if ~i(s~) = 0, Lemma 1 implies that G j(0)= Gj@i) Vj--/=i, which in turn implies that u~(_si, G-i) < limx~+o ui (xi, G-i) . This contradicts the hypothesis that s i > 0. If ei(_si) > 0, then Vj # i, ~j(~i) = 0, so G j(0) = limxj+_~ Gj(xj) leads to a similar contradiction.
If S contains more than one player, then an argument similar to that just made implies _s i =_sj > 0 Vi, jsS. At least one player ieS must employ a mixed strategy with ei(~i) = 0, for otherwise any jeS could gain by increasingsj by a small ~ > 0 (unless sj = v j, in which case j has incentive to reduce the bid vj to 0). But this means that there exist i,jr such that si =sj > 0 and ei@~) = 0, a contradiction to Lemma 1. Thus, we conclude that s i = 0 for all i.
[] The next lemma shows that, in any mixed-strategy equilibrium, each player 2 through n must employ a strategy that places an atom at 0, while player 1 cannot employ a strategy that places an atom at 0. This, in conjunction with Lemma 2, implies that players 2 through n earn equilibrium expected payoffs, u*, of zero. Proofi (a) Since player i would never use a strategy that puts mass on (vi, ~) (setting the bid equal to zero strictly dominates such a strategy), player 1 clearly has no incentive to use a strategy that puts mass in the interval (vz, vl] . Hence, Yi, gl -< v2 < vl, which guarantees that player i must have an equilibrium payoffu~ of at least vl -v z > 0. This, and the fact that not all players can use mixed strategies that have an atom at 0, implies that player l's mixed strategy cannot place an atom at 0. (b) From part (a), u~ > 0 in every neighborhood above 0, so player 1 must outbid every other player with a probability that is bounded away from zero. Thus, every player but player 1 must use a strategy that has an atom at 0. (c) Since player l's mixed strategy does not have an atom at 0, it follows from part (b) that Vi ~ 1,
u~ = ui(0, G_ i) = 0 []
We have now established that zero is the lower bound of the support of each player's equilibrium mixed strategy, that all players but player 1 must employ equilibrium strategies that contain an atom at 0, and that the equilibrium payoffs for players {2, 3 ..... n} are zero. The next lemma establishes that at least two players have v 2 as the upper bound of the support of their mixed strategies.
Lemma 4: g~ _< v2Vi, with strict equality for at least two players.
Proofi From the proof of Lemma 3, gi <-v2Vi. By way of contradiction, suppose g~ <v 2 for all i. By bidding above g-maxk{gk} by an arbitrarily small amount, player 2 can earn arbitrarily close to v 2 -g > 0 = u*, which contradicts Lemma 3. Thus, gi = v2 for at least one i. Another player j #i must also have gs = v2, for otherwise player i could gain by reducing gi by a small e > 0. [] The next five lemmas provide the rough characterization of the equilibrium strategies of players (2, 3 ..... n} stated in Theorem 2A. For notational convenience, we define Ai(x ) ~ H jc_iG j(x), Aik(X ) ~ H j~i,k G j(x) , and Aikh(X ) ~--Hj:~i,k,h G j(x ) . Proof: Suppose one of the cdf's, say Gi, has an atom at xi~ (0, v=] . Lemma 2 implies that Vx~(0,v2], AisG i > 0, and hence AijG ~ has an upward jump at x~, Vj ~ i. This follows directly from the monotonicity of the cdf's. For xi < v s this implies that player j can gain by transferring mass from an e-neighborhood below x~ to some neighborhood above xi. At x~ = v s it pays for j to transfer mass from an ~-neighborhood below x~ to zero. Thus, there would be an e-neighborhood below x~ in which no other player's mixed strategy puts mass. But then it is not an equilibrium strategy for player i to put mass at x~. [] Lemma 8 demonstrates that when n > m, players m + 1 through n bid zero with probability one. We now proceed to characterize the equilibrium strategies of players 1 through m. (b, b + e) . Hence, Bi(x ) <_ Bh(X ) Vx~ (b, b + e) , since such values ofx do not lie in i's support. But this implies that A~(x) < Ah(X), and hence Gh(X ) < @(X), a contradiction to the fact that Gi(b ) = Gh (b) , G h is increasing on (b, b + e) , and G i is constant on (b, b + g) 
